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Education under Occupation: 
Political Violence, Schooling, and Response in Cambodia, 1979-1989 
 
Thomas Clayton 
University of Kentucky 
  
 
Political Violence 
One hundred and twenty thousand Vietnamese troops crossed the border into 
Cambodia on December 25, 1978. As they sped toward Phnom Penh on roads built by 
the United States during the Vietnam War, they experienced little resistance from the 
forces of the Khmer Rouge, then the ruling power in Cambodia. The ease of the invasion 
was surprising, given that it had been planned as a response to fierce attacks on 
southern Vietnam by the Khmer Rouge. Neither the Khmer Rouge nor their 
international patron, the People's Republic of China, however, seriously contested the 
invasion and, in the words of Cambodian refugee Pin Yathay (1987), the Vietnamese 
"harvested Cambodia like a ripe fruit" (p. 237). Phnom Penh fell to the invading forces 
on January 7, 1979, and by June of that year most Khmer Rouge had been driven out of 
the country into neighboring Thailand (see Kiljunen, 1984; Porter, 1981). 
 
The invasion and subsequent ten-year occupation of Cambodia by the Vietnamese 
introduced a complex tension to the country. On one hand, Cambodians had suffered 
under the Khmer Rouge for nearly four years and, as a result of brutality and a series of 
disastrous initiatives intended to restructure society, between one and two million had 
died (see Clayton, 1998b). For many survivors, the Vietnamese invasion meant, first and 
foremost, the cessation of Khmer Rouge terror. In fact, nearly all of the many 
Cambodians with whom I talked about the invasion described the Vietnamese as saviors 
without whom they would surely have died. Perhaps the most impassioned assessment 
was offered by a Ministry of Education official in 1994. During the Khmer Rouge regime, 
he told me, "we prayed every day for someone to come and rescue us, [but] only 
Vietnam came to help us. I tell you honestly, in three months more of Khmer Rouge rule, 
we would all have been killed. [I] will never forget, and please, don't you forget. 
Everyone prayed, but only the Vietnamese came."1  
 
Beyond physical rescue, the Vietnamese invasion brought Cambodians salvation from 
the Khmer Rouge's policies of social destruction. Following their assumption of power 
in 1975, the Khmer Rouge had closed social institutions such as markets, temples, and 
schools and, in many cases, demolished their physical and human infrastructures. 
Between 1975 and 1979, for instance, it is estimated that 90 percent of all school 
buildings were destroyed and that 75 percent of all teachers, professors, and educational 
administrators were killed (Hirschhorn, Haviland, & Salvo, 1991; Ministry of Education, 
1990). Into this void, the Vietnamese sent literally thousands of development personnel, 
a significant number of whom worked in education. One Cambodian educator 
explained with a striking metaphor the gratitude and relief with which he and many 
others--overwhelmed by the prospect of reestablishing the system of education with 
most senior colleagues dead--welcomed the Vietnamese advisors. "At that time," he told 
me, "we were as if submerged under water. [The Vietnamese] came to us and held out a 
stick. [We] knew that we needed to grasp the stick or we would die." 
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While releasing Cambodians from the Khmer Rouge and rebuilding social institutions 
such as education, the Vietnamese also introduced structures to the country directed at 
least as much toward their own, as to Cambodian, interests. To use the distinction 
suggested by Gramsci (1971) and Althusser (1971), these structures comprised both 
coercive or repressive state apparatuses and hegemonic or ideological state apparatuses. 
The occupying army, reaching a strength of 220,000 at its peak, served a coercive 
function by its mere presence. Less obvious structures included the border region 
security project. In an effort to contain the Khmer Rouge, the Vietnamese initiated a 
forced-labor program to clear the jungle on the Thai border and expose incursions; 
thousands of Cambodians died while thus conscripted (Chandler, 1993; Luciolli, 1988; 
McBeth, 1985). Many Cambodians who opposed this or other Vietnamese policies were 
imprisoned (Martin, 1986), including one of my informants who served a two-year 
prison sentence for voicing views he termed more "liberal" than those endorsed by the 
Vietnamese, and Pen Sovan, the first prime minister of the post-Khmer Rouge 
government, who was removed from office in 1981 and incarcerated in Vietnam until 
1989 (Kiernan, 1982; Vickery, 1986). 
 
To complement coercion, the Vietnamese erected a sophisticated hegemonic apparatus 
dedicated to the dissemination of ideas congruent with their vision for the country. That 
vision, which the Vietnamese had been pursuing intermittently since Ho Chi Minh 
established the Indochinese Communist Party under orders from the Soviet Comintern 
in 1930, was to draw Cambodia into the international socialist revolution and to create a 
like-minded communist ally in Indochina (Engelbert & Goscha, 1995; Kiernan, 1985). 
Education served as the primary mechanism of this hegemonic mission civilisatrice. As 
several informants commented in nearly identical language, in the 1980s "All education, 
from primary school to higher education, conveyed Marxist-Leninist philosophy." In the 
following section, I discuss educational development in occupied Cambodia; for the 
purpose of brevity, I limit my discussion to the tertiary level, where the socialist 
orientation of schooling emerged perhaps most transparently. 
 
Schooling 
International educational assistance to Cambodia after the defeat of the Khmer Rouge 
provides a study in the politics of development. The United States, its Western allies, the 
People's Republic of China, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, opposed 
the Vietnamese occupation and the extension of Soviet influence in Indochina and, as a 
result, erected an embargo on aid that might be used to strengthen the new Cambodian 
government. U.S. influence emerged clearly among United Nations agencies, with those 
holding emergency mandates (Unicef, for instance) operating in Cambodia, and those 
with development mandates (United Nations Development Programme, for example) 
failing to initiate programs (Mysliwiec, 1988). Conversely, Vietnam and its allies in the 
Eastern bloc, intending the establishment of a friendly communist regime, provided 
significant amounts of assistance under the terms of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and 
Cooperation and other bilateral agreements (Haas, 1991; World Bank, 1992). In 
education, assistance took the form of advisors to the Ministry of Education, university 
professors, physical plant repair, books, equipment, and curricular materials, and 
scholarships by the thousands for advanced study at universities in Eastern-bloc 
countries. 
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The first higher education institute established after the Vietnamese invasion, the 
Faculty of Medicine, Dentistry, and Pharmacy, opened in December 1979. From 1980 to 
1983, between 10 and 20 doctors from the Vietnamese Ministry of Health assisted the 
few surviving Cambodian doctors in completing the medical training of students who 
had been enrolled before the Khmer Rouge regime; when new students began medical 
studies in the mid-1980s, the faculty established a six-year program. By 1983, enough 
Cambodian doctors had been trained to staff the institute fully, and the agreement with 
the Vietnamese Ministry of Health lapsed. 
 
For the first few years after the establishment of the Teachers' Training College in July 
1980, approximately 40 professors from the Vietnamese Ministry of General Education 
offered instruction to Cambodian students who had begun their tertiary education 
before 1975. Graduates of the three-year program (expanded to four years in 1988) 
assumed positions as teachers in Cambodia's high schools. In 1981, 16 graduates of the 
Teachers' Training College went to Vietnam for graduate studies. When they returned in 
1983 and joined as faculty those domestic graduates who had begun assuming teaching 
positions in 1981, the relative number of Vietnamese professors declined; all Vietnamese 
faculty had been replaced by 1987. 
 
In all, 2,650 Cambodians completed degree programs between 1983 and 1989 in the 
Soviet Union, East Germany, Vietnam, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Cuba. 
The School of Languages, opened in Phnom Penh in February 1981, supported these 
international ventures by providing language instruction to those slated for 
international education. Fifteen Soviets, two East Germans, fifteen Vietnamese, and one 
Cuban staffed the school's one-year intensive Russian, German, Vietnamese, and 
Spanish language programs throughout the occupation. 
 
The Khmer-Soviet Friendship Higher Technical Institute opened in September 1981. The 
Soviet Union supplied the institute with professors, books, materials, equipment, and 
physical plant repairs. Approximately 56 Soviet professors taught the Institute's five-
year courses in Civil Engineering, Electronic and Electrical Engineering, Industrial 
Chemistry, Agro-Hydrology, and Mines, Mining, and Geology throughout the 1980s. 
Though Cambodians were sent to the Soviet Union for advanced training, they had not 
returned to faculty positions at the Institute when the occupation ended in 1989. 
 
Vietnam provided all professors, texts, and curricula to the Economics Institute, opened 
in September 1984. Approximately 35-40 Vietnamese professors from the University of 
Economic Sciences in Hanoi staffed the institute, offering five-year courses in 
Agricultural Economy, Industrial Economy, Commerce, Finance, and Economic 
Planning; these professors had themselves studied in the Soviet Union, East Germany, 
or Hungary. In the mid-1980s, several graduates from the Economics Institute traveled 
to the Soviet Union for advanced academic training. When they returned in 1986, they 
began teaching the Institute's introductory classes. The proportion of Vietnamese 
professors further declined in 1989, when the Institute retained as faculty the 20 top 
members of the first graduating class. 
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The Agricultural Institute opened in January 1985. Consultants from the Ukrainian 
Agricultural Academy prepared the curriculum and provided textbooks, and 
approximately 56 professors from this and other Soviet agricultural institutes taught the 
four-and-a-half year courses in Agronomy, Forestry, Fisheries, Veterinary Medicine, and 
Agricultural Mechanics. Some students from the Agricultural Institute traveled to the 
Soviet Union for advanced training in the mid-1980s. As at the Technical Institute, 
however, these Cambodians had not yet returned by 1989, and the faculty thus 
remained entirely Soviet throughout the occupation. 
 
By 1990, Cambodia's institutes of higher education had graduated 977 doctors, dentists, 
or pharmacists, 2,196 senior secondary teachers, 1,481 foreign language specialists, 474 
technical engineers, 400 economists, and 184 agricultural engineers. It would be difficult 
to overestimate the importance of Vietnamese and Eastern-bloc assistance in producing 
this first generation of tertiary graduates. When I asked one Cambodian educator, for 
instance, if Cambodians themselves could have rebuilt the system of higher education, 
he replied with an unequivocal no, "because [we] didn't have trained staff yet after the 
genocide of the Khmer Rouge regime." Another Cambodian responded similarly. "It was 
as if we had to wait for someone to come and help us," he told me, "because, at that time, 
we had no intellectuals." 
 
Vietnam's important humanitarian contribution cannot, however, be disconnected from 
that country's hegemonic mission civilisatrice in occupied Cambodia. In fact, according 
to an educational policy statement written by Vietnamese advisors for the Cambodian 
Ministry of Education, "technical training" in medicine, economics, agriculture, and 
other fields assumed only secondary importance to "political" education: 
 
The main objective of higher and technical education is to provide good political 
training and good technical training. Political training for all the staff should promote an 
ideology concerned with [the] objectives of socialism. [We] need to recognize that the 
most important thing pertains to political training and ideology of students. (Problems 
of Higher and Technical Education, 1983; my emphasis)2. 
 
To ensure mastery of the "objectives of socialism," tertiary students were required to 
complete five courses, taught for the most part by Cambodians trained in Vietnam. 
"Marxist-Leninist Theories" intended "to endow in students the concept of the evolution 
of mankind toward socialism" (citations in this paragraph are from the document, 
Ideological and Political Training in Higher and Technical Education, 1984). In "World 
Revolutionary History and the History of the Cambodian Revolution," students were 
taught about the Soviet "October Revolution and the revolution of the three countries of 
Indochina to illustrate the history of the Cambodian revolution." "The Situation and the 
Role of the Revolution and the Policy of the Party" attempted to "build in [students] the 
right political consciousness." In "Moral Education and the Revolutionary Way of Life," 
students were to acquire "the spirit of being the master of the collective, the spirit of job 
responsibility, and the nationalist and internationalist spirit to support the interests of 
the people and the nation." Finally, "Attitude to the Common People" aimed to "improve 
the attitude of the intellectual revolutionary toward the common people" (for a detailed 
discussion of political education during the occupation, see Clayton, forthcoming b). 
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According to one informant, through political training the Vietnamese sought to "change 
[Cambodian's] brains to the new ways of thinking associated with socialism." Another 
informant presented this transformation in less pejorative terms. Political education, he 
concluded, would "form the new man" who "would be willing to fight against 
imperialism and capitalism." In other words, the Vietnamese intended to persuade 
Cambodians of the efficacy of their vision for the country through the mechanism of 
education. Early in the occupation, Vietnam promised to withdraw from Cambodia as 
soon as the new government gained enough strength to stand on its own (Haas, 1991). 
When their primary coercive force--the occupying army--had gone home, however, 
there would continue to exist in the country a hegemonic apparatus dedicated to 
Vietnamese interests. 
 
Response 
A considerable literature in comparative education links educational assistance, 
hegemony, and the international movement of real and symbolic capital (see, for 
example, Arnove, 1980; Ginsburg, 1991; Mundy, 1998). Little attention in this literature, 
however, has been given to the responses of subordinate actors. As I have argued 
elsewhere, most comparative education studies operate under the assumption that the 
recipients of educational assistance are "mystified" by dominant ideologies and 
internalize them, often to their detriment, without mediation or struggle (Clayton, 
1998a). Much like the Malaysian peasants studied by Scott (1985) or the Appalachian 
miners studied by Gaventa (1980), however, the Cambodians with whom I talked about 
the occupation betrayed little mystification about the hegemony they faced daily. 
 
At least some Cambodians accepted the invitation of political education and "changed 
their brains" during the occupation. Two former political education teachers in 
particular struck me as having consciously evaluated the promises of the new 
ideological order and found them genuinely attractive. Speaking for his students but 
also himself, one teacher told me that "students learned the material well, and I think 
they believed it." In response to my question, the other teacher answered, "Yes, they 
believed," and he continued: "They loved justice, and they hated the exploitation of 
capitalist regimes. They did not prefer capitalism and corruption. They didn't like 
poverty. Finally, they wanted to work with the party against the Khmer Rouge." These 
two teachers worked willingly to promote socialist principles in Cambodia and, even as 
they themselves converted to this new way of thinking, interpreted a genuine impact on 
students. 
 
Other Cambodians resisted socialist ideology, though their forms of resistance held little 
potential for transformation of occupation relations. When I asked one informant if 
political education had been effective, for example, he replied that it had not been. In 
fact, he continued, students avoided socialist ideology by "frequently sleeping during 
the classes." This same informant told me a story of his own participation in political 
education during advanced training in Vietnam and of another form of resistance 
practiced by Cambodian students: 
 
In 1988 I was in Vietnam, and we were watching the World Cup match between 
the Soviet Union and West Germany on television. Some of us wanted the 
capitalist team to win. The true believers wanted the Russian team to win. When 
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Russia lost, one who had supported that team became physically ill. The rest of 
us were afraid to root for the capitalist team. We were worried about supporting 
the capitalist team. We were happy when the team won, but we could not show 
our happiness. 
 
While some Cambodians converted to socialism during the occupation, and others 
demonstrated "everyday" forms of resistance to socialist ideology, yet other Cambodians 
merely gave the impression of having adopted new ways of thinking. As one informant 
put it, these Cambodians "changed their faces," not their brains. Several high-ranking 
members of the government, for instance, actively advanced socialist principles as 
political education teachers during the occupation. For many of my informants, this 
participation amounted to the exchange of ideological loyalty for positions of power in 
the communist regime. As one informant explained, "In communism, he who supports 
socialist ideology gets the high positions in the government, gets fancy cars, gets nice 
villas." Another concluded that "men who wanted to become powerful" professed the 
most fervent belief in socialism in the 1980s. 
 
The majority of Cambodians who "changed their faces," however, did not collaborate for 
personal gain, but pragmatically accepted socialist ideology because they saw 
themselves as having little choice to do otherwise. As one informant commented, "We 
didn't have any choice: We had to become socialist." Another Cambodian explained in 
more detail. "We had to accept [socialist] ideas," he told me. "The students had to accept 
these ideas. [They] were exposed to these ideas throughout their school careers. They 
had to accept them. There were no other philosophies to adopt. There was only the one: 
Marxism-Leninism." 
 
Several Cambodians who had been tertiary students during the occupation hinted 
toward the constraints that informed their pragmatic acceptance of socialist ideology. 
Recognizing that graduates were expected to be socialists first and doctors, teachers, and 
other professionals second, these Cambodians attended political education classes 
diligently and studied hard. As one informant explained, "If they did not learn [socialist 
ideology] and pretend to believe it, they would not be able to pass the exams, and they 
would have no future." Another informant commented similarly that students "did not 
believe the socialist principles we learned in the curriculum [but] answered according to 
these principles as outlined in the lectures or else they would have received a zero mark 
on exams." For these students, acceptance of socialist ideology stood, simply, as a 
precondition to participation in education and success after graduation. 
 
Cambodians' pragmatic response to hegemony emerged most clearly in a conversation 
with a former Ministry of Education official who had worked closely with the 
Vietnamese in the 1980s in opening the institutes of higher education. During the 
occupation, this man told me, "We were interested in rebuilding the country, not in 
serving a foreign ideology." When I then asked why, if Cambodians were not interested 
in socialism, so many at the Ministry of Education had cooperated with the Vietnamese 
by participating in political education themselves and by supporting the heavy 
emphasis on political education in schools, this informant looked at me as if I were a 
simpleton. We cooperated, he told me, "because we were unable to connect with 
countries of the West at that time due to the embargo [on development aid and because, 
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as a result, there] simply was no other possibility of assistance for us with which to 
rebuild the country." In other words, this and other Cambodians, dedicated to finding a 
way to provide education for Cambodian youth but severely constrained by the 
embargo that foreclosed the possibility of assistance from the West, pragmatically 
accepted socialist ideology as a necessary condition to the receipt of educational 
resources from Vietnam and other Eastern-bloc countries. 
 
Monument to a defunct ideology 
In 1989, as a result both of pressure from the West and of diminishing support from the 
Soviet Union, Vietnam withdrew from Cambodia, leaving a fragile but functioning 
government. Recognizing in Soviet perestroika and the similar dôi mu'o'i in Vietnam the 
failure of the international socialist revolution, the newly independent Cambodian 
government moved toward a multiparty political system and a free-market economy. 
Following the United Nations-sponsored elections in 1993, the United States and other 
Western countries established diplomatic and development aid relations with Cambodia 
(see Heder & Ledgerwood, 1996). 
 
The period between the Vietnamese withdrawal and the election proved very difficult 
for Cambodian education, particularly at the tertiary level. Along with troops, most 
Vietnamese educational advisors and professors departed in 1989; Soviet professors 
withdrew shortly after, when the Soviet Union collapsed. In some cases, higher 
education institutes filled teaching vacancies with recently graduated Cambodians. In 
other cases, however, students sent overseas for advanced study had not yet finished 
their courses, and institutes faced overwhelming constraints. The Agricultural Institute 
closed briefly in 1990, and the Technical Institute might have closed had the United 
Nations not brought 28 Soviet teachers back in 1991. 
 
Even while engaged in these struggles to maintain viability, the Ministry of Education 
initiated reforms congruent with post-occupation ways of thinking. Most significantly, 
between 1989 and 1991, Cambodians eliminated the system of political education in 
place during the occupation and canceled courses in Marxism-Leninism. As one 
Cambodian explained in 1994, after the Vietnamese withdrawal and the turn away from 
Eastern-bloc systems and practices, "we did not want to continue with communist 
dogma [that] was not important for our students." 
 
One symbol of Cambodia's ideological history stands on Pochentong Road in Phnom 
Penh. As a parting gift in 1989, the Vietnamese built on this spot a magnificent Political 
Training College dedicated to the continuing promotion of socialist ideology in 
Cambodia. With its polished wood and terrazzo, its sweeping facade, and its spacious 
commons, the college is by far the most impressive educational facility in the country. 
When I visited in 1994, I was surprised to find the college empty and suffering for lack 
of maintenance. With the cessation of political education in 1989, my companion told 
me, the facility had never been used. When I marveled at the building and expressed 
amazement at the effort expended by Vietnam in the service of a now-defunct 
ideological system, my companion just shrugged. "It's all gone now," he concluded. 
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Notes 
 
1. I collected data for this article in 1991, 1992, and 1994. During a 13 months' residence 
in Phnom Penh, I interviewed more than 50 Cambodians, most of whom had 
worked in education in the 1980s. My informants included current or former 
teachers, professors, and administrators in general and higher education, 
bureaucrats in the Phnom Penh Municipal Department of Education and the 
National Ministry of Education, educators attached to other ministries, and 
Cambodians with relevant knowledge in other government posts. All direct quotes 
from Cambodians, as well as most information about the system of education in the 
1980s, come from these interviews. 
 
2. For the text pf this document, as well as the document "Ideological and Political 
Training in Higher and Technical Education" (referred to below and also written by 
the Vietnamese for the Cambodian Ministry of Education), see Clayton (forthcoming 
a). 
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